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Fortress Europe: The Myth
Martin Bangemann *
The anticipation of the 1992 continental-wide market has already
had an unexpected effect: one-third of the average 3.7% increase in eco-
nomic growth of the European Community for 1988 is the result of in-
vestors anticipating the big market.' This is the clearest signal the
business community could make to show its confidence in Europe. This
is the beginning of the most extensive exercise of deregulation the Euro-
pean Community has experienced since its creation in the 1950s. Every-
body agrees that it is an irreversible trend.
Long gone is the "benign neglect" of those on Wall Street and Penn-
sylvania Avenue that led the United States press to coin the sinister
"Europessimism" concept of the early 1980s. Indeed, during last year,
many East Coast analysts depicted Europe as a five trillion dollar econ-
omy, thus granting the EC the economic powerhouse status it deserves.2
But awe often goes hand in hand with envy, which has resulted in the
fashionable East Coast notion of "Fortress Europe."
Before killing this myth, one crucial but often forgotten issue must
be clarified: there is indeed nothing more legitimate for the Community
than wanting to achieve one single market, abolishing national frontiers,
and letting goods, persons, services and capital circulate freely. After all,
this is one of the very essential goals set out in the 1950s when the Euro-
pean Community was created. Some people still take the simplistic view
that these endeavors will result in the setting up of a "free-trade area" in
Europe. The difference between a free-trade area and the Community is
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fundamental both in philosophical and political terms. The European
Community's future reaches far beyond the 1992 Internal Market con-
cept. The latter, however important, is merely a step towards a true
political union.
Quite obviously, the Internal Market concept has captured the im-
agination of the world. Its content and its consequences are at the center
of an intensive debate. This is a direct consequence of the dawning con-
viction that the Internal Market program is now unstoppable and will
change the face of both the Community and the world economy.
There is widespread anxiety that the Community might erect a pro-
tective wall around its Internal Market and turn its back on the liberal
world economic system. The nightmare prospect of a "Fortress Europe"
has repeatedly made the headlines. These anxieties are paradoxically ac-
companied by fears inside the Community that the breaking down of
internal barriers might operate above all to the advantage of foreign com-
panies who sell within the Community market, and thus providing our
partners with gratuitous benefits. Both fears are without foundation.
The achievement of the Internal Market will be of economic benefit not
only to Community citizens, but also to the world economy as a whole.
The related external policy measures also will represent a coherent ap-
proach based on a sober analysis of Community interests and respect for
those of our partners.
The impact on the world economy of the Internal Market will de-
pend partly on the predictable economic consequences of the replace-
ment of twelve separate markets by one, and partly on the content of the
accompanying external policy measures. Both Community producers
and foreign exporters will benefit directly from operating in an Internal
Market with a generally uniform set of regulations, standards, testing
and certification procedures. They will no longer have to face twelve
divergent sets of requirements, nor intra-Community border controls.
All will gain from lower costs and from the exploitation of the economies
of scale offered by a market of 320 million consumers.
The now widely known Cecchini report3 has estimated the macro-
economic consequences which will follow the completion of the internal
market, even in the absence of additional external policy measures.
These estimates suggest that intra-Community trade should increase by
some 10% in the medium term. The improved competitiveness of Com-
munity producers will also stimulate Community exports to the rest of
3 P. CECCHINI, ET. AL., RESEARCH ON THE CosT OF NoN-EUROPE, (ISBN 92-825-8605-7).
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the world by 10%. Imports into the Community, which will accompany
its increased growth, will also rise.
In a word, the combination of the increased dynamism, which is
inherent in the creation of the Internal Market, and the exploitation of
the opportunities it will provide to pursue growth-orientated
macroeconomic policies will allow the Community to provide a powerful
new stimulus to the world economy, many of whose problems stem pre-
cisely from the sluggish growth it has experienced in recent years.
The total impact of the Internal Market on our partners will also be
determined in part by the content given to its external policy dimension.
This policy is not new. The Treaty of Rome, which provided for the
removal of all customs barriers between Member states, also set up a
common external policy, in particular with respect to the Common Mar-
ket it created. This gave the Community an external identity to match
its intensifying internal integration. The 1992 program simply extends
and deepens this Internal Market philosophy and introduces the mecha-
nisms to achieve it. It is therefore natural that they be accompanied by a
corresponding extension and completion of external policy. This means
the development of Community rules for access to the market for third
country producers in all those areas in which the Internal Market is
achieved. In many cases, this will mean the replacement of existing
Member States' policy measures by community action.
The need to extend the scope of Community external policy action
in this way has been misunderstood by some as an intention to raise the
level of protection. To the contrary, its content will be closely related to
the objectives it is intended to achieve. The European Council, during
the so-called European Summit, has expressed a general policy line as
follows:
The Internal Market should not close in on itself. In conformity with the
provisions of GATT, the Community should be open to third countries,
and must negotiate with these countries where necessary to ensure access to
their markets for Community exports. It will seek to preserve the balance
of advantages accorded, while respecting the identity of the Internal Market
of the Community.4
This important statement underlines the Community's commitment to
the liberal multilateral trading system. This commitment reflects the re-
ality that the Community is the worlds largest trading partner and that
external trade plays a much larger proportional role in its economy than
in those of other major trading partners.
The logic of the Internal Market assumes that by lowering the costs
4 Meeting of the European Council, in Hannover, West Germany (June 27-28, 1988).
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and increasing the home market base of European companies, these com-
panies will be in a stronger competitive position vis-A-vis third-country
producers, both in Europe and in international markets. The full benefits
of this increased competitiveness can only be reaped if it can be trans-
lated into increased world trade on the basis of comparative advantage.
This is an argument for reinforcing the existing liberal, multilateral trade
system by seeking the mutually advantageous opening of world markets,
not for triggering a protectionist spiral which could only reduce market
opportunities for competitive community producers. In other words,
"Fortress Europe" does not make sense. The Community's commitment
to liberalization is not rhetoric. It is the simple reflection of our interests,
which coincide with those of our partners.
Moreover, building such a fortress would be suicidal. With over
20% or more of world trade (the United States accounts for 14% and
Japan for 9%),5 the EC is by far the most open trading partner in the
world. We have nothing to gain through protections. Three divergent
classes of external policy measures in connection with the Internal Mar-
ket can be distinguished. Some are indispensable if internal barriers are
to be removed, many are covered by the existing international obligations
of the Community, and others represent virgin territory with respect
both to Community policy and to international rules.
The best example of external policy measures which are indispensa-
ble are the gaps which still exist in the common commercial policy itself.
These gaps are a result of the wide divergences between the import re-
gimes applicable in individual Member States. One area of concern is the
quantitative restrictions placed on some imports from Japan and Eastern
Europe. Another area of concern is the limits fixed for individual Mem-
ber States within the Community's quotas under bilateral textile agree-
ments, and for sensitive products in its Generalized System of
Preferences for developing countries. Such measures will make no sense
when boarder posts disappear between our Member States, because they
will no longer be enforceable. After 1992, the Community's rules on im-
ports from third countries will need to be fully unified. In many cases,
the national restrictions will simply be eliminated. This may require
Community assistance to restructure certain sensitive sectors.
By the end of 1992, however, there will still be a limited hard core of
products where particular economic difficulties in some Member States
may require the replacement of national protective measures by appro-
priate measures at the Community level. Any such measures would have
5 Trade figures supplied by EUROSTAT, the statistical office of the European Community.
The figures represent levels of trade for 1987.
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to be in full conformity with the Community's obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). With respect to
this class of measures, the final effect of an extension of Community ex-
ternal policy is unambiguous. The Community market as a whole will
have a lower level of protection than it does now.
A second class of measures concerns those many areas in which new
external action will be fully subject to the Community's existing obliga-
tions, whether these be multilateral - such as GATT and the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") or bilateral
such as the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA"), Loma, and the
Mediterranean Countries. These agreements are already based largely on
procedures directed towards the progressive liberalization of world mar-
kets. Thus, the extension of the scope of Community action within them
will result, once again, in a worldwide decrease, not an increase, of
protection.
Finally, a number of measures will break new ground by extending
Community external action to fields not covered by international rules.
Here the same logic applies. The same objective of worldwide market
opening needs to be pursued.
How can this objective be achieved? GATT experience shows that
in multilateral negotiations designed to liberalize access to markets, pro-
gress is made by all participants exchanging "concessions" in such a way
that a mutually advantageous balance of benefits for all parties emerges
from the negotiations. This technique is often described as being based
on a concept of "overall reciprocity." In this sense, reciprocity is an ac-
cepted and central element of trade policy. As a recent report by the
Congressional Research Service on the 1992 program pointed out: "Reci-
procity has been a central concept of U.S. trade policy since the adoption
of unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment in 1923. " 6
In passing, it is important to note that overall reciprocity implies
neither that all countries make the same concessions, nor that all coun-
tries are required to contribute equivalent concessions. The level of con-
tribution possible may depend on the level of development of a country.
There is no question of the Community demanding concessions from its
developing country partners which they are unable to make.
In many policy areas, the multilateral pursuit of liberalization has
been underway for decades. As already noted, the international obliga-
tions which the Community has entered into as part of this process (e.g.,
6 See K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 59




GATT and OECD) will continue to be fully respected. In those areas
not yet covered by existing rules, such as much of the services trade, it
will be the Community's aim to achieve a further liberalization through
the negotiation of new international agreements. The Uruguay Round
negotiations provide a major opportunity to do this. When they are
successfully concluded, the commitments to which the Community sub-
scribes will be fully reflected in its external regime.
Until such agreements have entered into force, it would be foolish
for the Community to extend the benefits of its own liberalization process
to third countries unilaterally. At that time, it would be reasonable to
expect comparable liberalization measures from these countries. On the
other hand, these benefits will be available to our partners where a mu-
tual balance of advantages, in the spirit of GATT, already exists or can
be achieved through negotiations. This, of course, implies the mainte-
nance of conditions on access to the Community market. These condi-
tions will be maintained, however, only where they are not contrary to
our obligations, and pending the achievement of a satisfactory degree of
overall reciprocity as part of a multilateral or bilateral negotiating pro-
cess. This approach does not imply that our trading partners should
adopt legislation identical to our own; that would be quite unreasonable.
Neither are we seeking "sectoral reciprocity" in the sense of balancing
trade in each sector between the Community and each of its partners.
We have successfully prevented the United States from introducing this
sectoral reciprocity into its law.
The Community's message, I hope, is clear: it is proposing to third
countries a partnership designed to ensure that the liberalization, which
is inherent to the achievement of the Single Market, echoes around the
world. Far from building a fortress, the Community is taking the lead in
proposing a new, cooperative effort to revitalize the world economy.
The outside world is right to recognize the importance of this pro-
gram to complete the Internal Market and to examine its possible impact
on third countries. The fact that this interest often leads to anxiety and
concern highlights the need to explain carefully what is involved. The
Community's decision-making process is already exceptionally transpar-
ent and unhurried, but as the pace of legislative change quickens in the
approach to 1992, there may be a need for more intensified use of existing
channels of consultation with third countries when individual proposals
could have a direct bearing on international trade. The Community has
always been and will remain open to requests for such consultation.
But such a readiness should not be misread: the Single European
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Act, 7 which updated the EC treaties of the end of the 1950s, defines the
ingredients of the Internal Market. This Act is neither a scrap of paper
nor a declaration of good intent. The Single European Act has a clear
constitutional value. It is Community law endorsed by all Parliaments
and Governments of the Twelve. Thus, the Single Act is not negotiable,
and is here to stay.
7 Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987).
